Home > Gulf War Diary > TAA Wendy
The turning point in the entire deployment occurred on January 7, 1991. That is when we started deploying from AA Horse to TAA Wendy. From here on out, there was no more just training and waiting; from this point on, we would conduct actual military operations against an armed enemy. It would be tough, but our morale would be high because we were doing something concrete. It seems ironic that soldiers' morale would be higher during periods of combat operations than during other phases of the deployment, but that's the way it was. Of course, the stunning success we had against the Iraqis during the Gulf War had a lot to do with that.
The tactical reasons behind moving to TAA Wendy were as follows: CINCCENT decided to "slice" the 1st UK Armored Division to VII Corps instead of having them fight with the USMC units in the east. That left the Marines without heavy armor support. Consequently, CINCCENT directed that the First Cavalry Division give up the "Tiger Brigade" to the Marines. That left the First Cavalry Division with only 2 brigades; therefore, CINCCENT made the First Cavalry Division the ARCENT reserve. As the theater reserve, the 1st Cavalry Division had to re-deploy to KKMC, in the Wadi Al Batin, to be positioned to respond to a variety of contingency plans. The biggest concern was that the Republican Guard would try a preemptive attack down the Wadi Al Batin/Ruqi Road to seize KKMC, an important target because it hosted a theater logistics stockpile and air base.
My battery was tasked to provide the quartering party to provide the initial security at the TAA. I elected to send 1st platoon with 1LT Kearse and SFC Wright; I would take personal charge of the main body.
On January 7, 1991, the Quartering Party went to the HET upload site in AA Horse to upload its track vehicles for the long (about 500 km) trip to TAA Wendy. There was an acute shortage of HETs because VII Corps was also using many HETs to move its equipment from the port to their forward assembly areas. As a result, I was only able to send one FDC and 2 howitzer sections with the quartering party (2 howitzers, 2 FAASVs). I could not help but think that the 1st Cavalry Division should have moved in December, as originally scheduled, when HETs were plentiful.
The next day, the remainder of the battery broke down the LSA and prepared to move out to the upload site staging area. While breaking down the LSA, we got a "RED AIR" warning over CF2 (one of our radio nets). It sounded so convincing that I though it was the real thing, that we would actually come under air attack in a few seconds. My gut tightened up as SFC Ramirez, one of my NCOs, locked and loaded an M-60 machine gun. It turned out to be an overreaction; some defecting Iraqi HIND helicopters had flown into Saudi Arabia and surrendered. The theater wide shortage of HETs was still a big problem, so the best I was able to do that day was to piecemeal out some 1st platoon vehicles (1 howitzer, 1 FAASV).
On January 9, we were directed to send combat vehicles forward first because our higher headquarters thought the Iraqi grab for KKMC was becoming more and more likely. According to intelligence reports, the Iraqis were supposedly staging Republican Guard units to do just that. Consequently, I sent two howitzers forward. It occurred to me that if the Iraqis were to attack, we would be in big trouble. "WE SHOULD HAVE MOVED FORWARD IN DECEMBER!" I thought. From January 10-11, the HET shortage was so acute that I was only able to move a howitzer, FAASV, and M577 FDC track forward.
On January 12, I uploaded only one howitzer, but MAJ Currid (the battalion XO) directed me to trail the HET convoy that was going to KKMC at 1000 hours. My mission, of course, was to keep the unreliable civilian HET drivers focused on getting their cargo to KKMC as quickly as possible. The first problem the convoy encountered occurred on Route "Mercedes" less than 30 miles north of AA Horse. A HET carrying a B Battery howitzer ran off the road; apparently, the driver was more concerned about lighting a cigarette than driving, and lost control of his vehicle. I got them back on the road as quickly as possible, and then chased after the rest of the convoy, which by then had reached the MP traffic control point at An Nai'riyah and turned onto the infamous "Tapline Road".
The Tapline Road was the major east-west two lane highway running the length of Saudi Arabia from the Persian Gulf in the east to Jordan in the west. It was so named because it paralleled the oil tapline that was used to pump oil from Persian Gulf petroleum fields to other points throughout the country. The Tapline Road was, on average, only 50 kilometers from Saudi Arabia's northern border; as a result, it was what the military calls "key terrain"; it was also the theater east-west MSR (major supply route).
The traffic on the Tapline Road was so heavy that it quickly earned the nickname "Suicide Alley." The combination of coalition military traffic and Saudi civilian traffic made traffic conditions there insane. It seemed as though safety was not a word in anybody's vocabulary. Big tractor trailers tearing down the highway at 80 mph; soldiers and civilians alike passing vehicles recklessly on a narrow two lane highway with a lot of oncoming traffic. As we made the left hand turn onto the Tapline road, it started pouring, the first rain since I arrived in Saudi Arabia 3 months ago. Other than that, the long march went pretty smoothly until 2300 hours, when the HET carrying one of my howitzers threw its fan blade into its radiator, causing it to break down. With the HET disabled, we downloaded the howitzer, and drove it to MCP (maintenance control point) "Colorado." There, I instructed the section chief to wait for a replacement HET, and I got back into my HMMWV and proceeded on to KKMC.
At 0200 hours, January 13, 1991, I finally pulled into the TAA Wendy HET Download site. We spent a few hours downloading and accounting for personnel and vehicles, and waited for the arrival of the battalion guide, 1LT Frahm. Once he arrived, we proceeded to the 3-82 FA TAA, arriving at about 0500 hours.
After eating some breakfast, I went up to the TOC to talk to the battalion commander, LTC Knight. He briefed me on OPLAN 91-1, defense of KKMC, which was our current contingency plan. Our mission was as follows: On order, we were to move north to Battle Position Duke, located south-east of the Saudi town of Hafar Al Batin, and south of the town of Quasumah. Once there, we were to defend to prevent an Iraqi seizure of King Khalid Military City. The other commanders had done a rather cursory route reconnaissance the day prior, and LTC Knight directed me to go out and do my own recon the next day so I'd be totally up to speed on this contingency plan. I told him "roger," and went back to my battery to get a situation update from my people.
At 1000 hours, 1LT Kearse and 1SG Pape give me a SITREP. At that time, we had
only 6 of 8 howitzers, 4 of 8 FAASVs, and only 50% of personnel present for
duty. The rest of the battery was either still at AA Horse waiting for
transportation, or enroute. At 1200 hours, I inspected the battery area. At
this stage of the game, soldiers had been issued ammo, and the atmosphere was
extremely tense. It was almost as if I could feel war in the air. By 1400
hours, I had completed my inspection, and went back to my tent. Since my bags
were soaked from the movement to TAA Wendy, I downloaded them and hung my
soaked clothing around the tent in the hopes that they would dry. At this
point, I had been awake for 32 straight hours, and was looking forward to some
sleep.
